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Abstract
This paper examines the inter-Korean conflict from the 
perspective of a problem-solving approach, limiting it to the 
confrontation over the ideal state of ethnic unity, and the reign 
of Korea. In order to make negotiations for resolution successful, 
it is necessary for the parties to have the intention to form an 
agreement, to execute it, and to have continuous execution 
ability. Both sides of the North and South are required to be 
responsible governments that can continuously implement 
agreements. It is only when that trust is built that it is possible to 
modify each objective and to build cooperative relationships. The 
possibility of building such a trust relationship is also considered.
1　This paper is prepared for an annual conference of the Taiwan/Japan/
Korea Peace Forum, May 15, 2019, in Jeju, Korea.
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1. The Nature of the North–South Korean Conflict: Framework for 
Understanding
(1) Defining “Conflict”
　In conflict resolution research, conflict is understood as arising 
when multiple individuals or groups see each other as pursuing aims 
that cannot simultaneously be met. Each individual/group believes 
that if one of them tries to realize their aims, then the other will have 
to give up on realizing or change its own aims. 
2
　How can we describe the conflict between North and South Korea 
in light of this definition? In order to understand a conflict, one 
must identify those who are in conflict, other involved parties, and 
their relationships, make clear what the conflict is about, as well as 
understand the process by which the conflict arose and its structure.
　As is well known, it will soon be seventy-four years since the 
Korean Peninsula was split in two. With Japan’s defeat in World War 
II the Korean people should have been liberated and acquired self-
determination, but as a result of the conflict between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, the peninsula was divided into two, and 
two governments were established that were strongly influenced by 
these two countries’ different founding principles. Here I attempt to 
understand the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), which declared their 
founding in 1948 to be the direct parties of the North―South Korean 
conflict.
　Incidentally, although the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed 
in 1953, the Korean War (which began in 1950) is still technically 
2　Uesugi pp.113-115, Ramsbotham pp.34-36
Possibilities of Cooperative Conflict Resolution: 
ongoing, so perhaps we should see the Korean War as the “conflict” 
on the Korean Peninsula. However, the primary signers of the 1953 
armistice were the United Nations Command (the US) and the 
Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (the Chinese). While Kim Il-sung, 
Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army, also signed it, it 
was not signed by a South Korean representative.
　The Korean War should not be understood as a conflict between 
North and South but as an international conflict, and while South 
Korea was a direct victim of the Korean War, it was not a primary 
party in peace negotiations.
　Then, what is the conflict between North and South Korea? Here, 
I would like to consider this issue while limiting myself to the polity 
of a unified Korean Peninsula and people, as well as conflict over the 
right to rule a unified Korea.
(2) Approaches to Conflict Resolution
　Conflict resolution research both makes clear via analysis the 
structures of conflicts and tries to present methods for solving 
them by changing parties’ “perceptions” that they are in a trade-off 
relationship in which it is impossible for them to realize both of their 
demands (aims).
　In military conflicts (such as wars between states) in which force 
is exercised and violent acts are carried out, conflict management 
efforts, such as conflict regulation and containment, are made. 
However, these are in many ways stopgap measures, and approaches 
have also been developed that eliminate the causes of the conflict 
and aim for a permanent resolution.
　One example is trying to shift the opposing relationship between 
those in conflict into a cooperative one in which they each share 
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the aim of eliminating points of conflict. A well-known example of 
this method is the “problem-solving approach.” This is premised 
on an environment in which those in conflict can engage in direct 
negotiation. Research on negotiation techniques for conflict 
resolution has also progressed, and therein one finds the method 
called “collaborative negotiation.”
　In order to make negotiations successful, parties need mutual 
understanding and efforts to be understood. For this purpose, there 
are the techniques of “informing” the other party of one’s worldview, 
negotiating climate, position, and needs, as well as of having an “open 
mind” and “uniting,” which build a foundation for sharing aims and 
creating solutions. 
3
　The secret negotiations that made possible the 1993 Oslo Accords, 
which surprised the world due to Israel and the Palestine Liberation 
Organization’s (PLO) relationship changing greatly from an intense 
oppositional one (to the extent that they rejected each other’s 
existence) to mutual recognition, are a good example of a problem-
solving approach that made full use of collaborative negotiation. 
4
Norway, who propelled the secret negotiations, subsequently played 
an important role in promoting conflict resolution in Aceh and Sri 
Lanka.
　However, subsequently the peace in Palestine untangled, and today 
the Oslo process is seen as having failed. We could say that this once 
again showed the difficulty of transforming zero-sum-game conflicts. 
It appears that conflict and division within the parties in conflict was 
a major factor that prevented the implementation of the “agreement.”
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who signed the Oslo Accords, 
3　Raider pp.31-88
4　See Corbin for the negotiation process leading to the Oslo agreement.
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was assassinated two years later by a young right-wing Jewish 
extremist. In this and other ways, on the one hand, anti-peace 
forces have expanded, while on the other hand, in Palestine, Islamic 
fundamentalist groups like the Hamas emerged as major forces 
opposing the PLO and intensified attacks against Israel.
　While collaborative negotiation is effective in having parties 
agree upon new solutions, in order for agreed-upon solutions to be 
implemented, there is a need for those who reached the agreement to 
intend and have the ability to implement them in a sustained fashion.
　With all of this in mind, I would like to examine how agreements 
between North and South Korea have been reached to solve the 
conflict and the efforts of the two countries to make these agreements 
a reality.
2. North and South Korea Unification and Policy Transformations 
5
　I have stated my position that the Korean War should be 
understood as an international conflict. The intention of Kim Il-sung, 
who started the war, was to have North Korea unify the peninsula 
via military force. This has been pointed out by multiple researchers. 
However, due to a massive counterattack by the United States, 
he was unable to fulfill this aim, and as a result the North―South 
division became fixed.
　Subsequently, North Korea would advocate North―South 
federalism and then come to offer proposals aiming for the 
unification of the two states. North Korea has called for a North 
Korea-led unification of the peninsula via the “democratization of 
5　Regarding changes in the theory of north-south unification, referred to 
Asai, IPP, Kimiya 2006, Kurata, Kuroda.
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South Korean politics” (a socialist revolution in South Korea and the 
kicking out of US forces from the country). This is shown by Kim Il-
sung’s statement, “If American imperialism is driven away, and a 
people’s democratic revolution is victorious in South Korea, and 
then the people are able to hold political power in their own hands, 
then via the power of Northern socialist forces and South Korean 
democratic forces, the great deed of the unification of our ancestral 
land will be carried out.” 
6
　On the other hand, Syngman Rhee, holding that the South Korean 
government, which was recognized by the UN, was the Korean 
Peninsula’s only legal government, did not recognize the North 
Korean government and advocated the recovery of the northern part 
of the Korean Peninsula. Even after Syngman Rhee was gone and the 
Chang Myon and Park Chung-hee administrations came into power, 
they saw South Korea as a legitimate UN recognized government 
and made clear that their approach was to eliminate communist 
forces. North and South Korea were in a classical zero-sum-game-like 
conflict in which they each advocated exclusively acquiring ruling 
rights in the peninsula.
　However upon entering the 1970s, due to changes in international 
conditions, such as the intensification of the conflict between the 
People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union, improvements in 
US-PRC relations, and the PRC becoming the UN representative of 
China, North Korea looked to improve its relations with the South, 
and in 1972 the “July 4 South―North Korea Joint Statement” was 
released. Here the so-called three principles of unification were 
proclaimed, which state that “peaceful unification” is a shared aim.
6　Regarding the history of north-south negotiation, referred to Asai, NDL 
2019.
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　However, the statement’s call to “faithfully carry out these agreed 
items” was not put into practice. There are almost no cases in which 
post-military conflict peace treaties are completely implemented 
(this includes the aforementioned Oslo Accords). Often a process 
of agreement violations, renegotiations, and the conclusion of a 
modified agreement is repeated. This is because those in conflict 
proceed with negotiations while hiding desires that would lead to 
argument in order to reach an agreement for the time being.
　While it is not insignificant that approximately twenty years after 
the Korean War the two governments released a joint statement, it 
was not an agreement for changing North―South relations but a 
way of shelving such changes and trying to avoid a confrontational 
situation.
　From the latter half of the 1960s onwards, South Korea experienced 
rapid economic growth and democratization was advanced. Amidst 
this, there were efforts for North―South unification, referred to as 
“Nordpolitik” (Northern Policy).
　In the July 7th Declaration (the Special Declaration for National 
Self-Esteem, Unification, and Prosperity) that President Roh Tae-
woo announced in 1988, we find the following: “In order to create the 
conditions that establish peace on the Korean Peninsula, North Korea 
is ready to improve its relationships with our allies such as Japan and 
the United States, and we will pursue improved relations with socialist 
countries, including the Soviet Union and China.” It tried to lead 
North Korea toward coexistence with the South, which was sought by 
the South’s government, by enclosing it internationally. Also, because 
North Korea was unable to avail support from the Soviet Union or 
China, as both countries were stuck in economic doldrums at the end 
of the Cold War, it called for economic exchange between North and 
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South Korea trying to make North Korea’s economy dependent upon 
that of the South.
　The December 1991 “Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, 
and Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea” 
was born out of these circumstances. Also, at the end of 1991, the 
“Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization 
of the Korean Peninsula” was released as well.
　However, due to the 1993―1994 North Korean nuclear crisis, North 
Korea came to be seen as a political and military threat by the 
international community, particularly Japan and the United States. 
This also meant the strengthening of an external factor that restricted 
negotiations between the North and South, the parties in conflict, 
namely, US’s influence.
　The Kim Dae-jung administration, which began in 1998, promoted 
a “Sunshine Policy” in order to unify North and South Korea via a 
three-stage process. In June 2000, meetings were held between the 
two countries’ heads of state, and they released a joint statement. 
Based on the idea that stable unification of the North and the South 
would become possible as the economic gap between the two 
countries lessened, South Korean business provided their economic 
and technological power as well as support for economic rebuilding 
to North Korea.
　However, US President George Bush criticized Iraq, Iran, and North 
Korea as the “axis of evil” in his 2002 State of the Union Address, and 
in 2003 attacked Iraq due to suspicions that it was producing weapons 
of mass destruction, toppling the Saddam Hussein administration. 
It was in this context that the second North Korean nuclear crisis 
happened.
　However, Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy was carried on by Roh 
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Moo-hyun. In 2004 operations began at the Kaesong Industrial Zone. 
While North Korea had carried out three nuclear tests, the zone was 
never closed during this time. In 2007 a heads of states meeting was 
held in Pyongyang between President Roh Moo-hyun and Defense 
Chairman Kim Jong-il, and the “Declaration on the Advancement of 
South―North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity” was released.
　This declaration called for both the North and South to cooperate 
to end the Korean War as well as work to implement the six-party 
talks’ agreement in order to solve the peninsula’s nuclear problem. 
However, while the December 6, 2008 six-party talks aimed to put into 
writing a framework for verifying North Korea’s denuclearization, an 
agreement was not reached, and no six-party talks have been held 
since then.
　The Lee Myung-bak administration, which began in February 2008, 
adopted a different approach than the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-
hyun administrations. It sought denuclearization and the opening up 
of North Korea as conditions for economic assistance to the country. 
However, on July 11th, a South Korean female tourist was shot and 
killed by a North Korean soldier on Mount Kumgang, and the Mount 
Kumgang Tourist Region project came to a halt. Also, in May 2009, 
North Korea carried out two nuclear tests. Then due to the ROKS 
Cheonan sinking in March 2010, South Korea halted all exchange 
and trade with North Korea (excluding that in the Keasong Industrial 
Zone). Due to this, the bombardment of Yeonpyeong by North Korea 
in November, and other reasons, North―South relations hit a brick 
wall.
　In February 2013, the Park Geun-hye administration began. It 
advocated as its policy toward North Korea a “trust-building process 
on the Korean Peninsula” that aimed for the development of North
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―South relations based on mutual trust. However, North Korea 
continued to arm itself with nuclear weapons, carried out three 
nuclear tests in February 2013 and four in January 2016, and launched 
a ballistic missile in February 2016. Aiming to cut off funding sources 
for weapons of mass destruction development, South Korea halted 
operations at the Kaesong Industrial Zone and North―South relations 
worsened.
　In May 2017, Moon Jae-in became president, and for the first time 
in nine years, political forces seen as conciliatory toward North 
Korea held the reins of government. However, North Korea pushed 
forward with its nuclearization, continuing to launch ballistic missiles 
and so on. With the rapid worsening of the relations between US and 
North Korea, the advancement of North―South relations was seen as 
difficult.
　However, North―South dialogue rapidly advanced from the 
beginning of 2018 with the Pyeongchang Olympic Winter Games soon 
approaching. On April 27, President Moon Jae-in and Chairman Kim 
Jong-un met in Panmunjon and released the “Panmunjom Declaration 
for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula,” 
which confirmed the following objectives: (1) improving North―South 
relations, (2) alleviating military tensions on the Korean Peninsula, 
and (3) constructing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.
　In June of the same year, a heads of states meeting was held between 
President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un. Their joint statement 
read, “President Trump is committed to provide security guarantees 
to the DPRK, and Chairman Kim Jong-un reaffirmed his firm and 
unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula.” Then, in September of the same year, President Moon 
Jae-in visited Pyongyang, and, along with Kim Jong-un, signed the 
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“Pyongyang Joint Declaration” that called for (1) an end to a militarily 
hostile relationship, (2) the advancement of economic cooperation, 
(3) the solving of the issue of separated families, (4) the promotion of 
cultural exchange, and (5) the advancement of denuclearization.
３． Are Shared North–South Objectives Possible?
　In the decades since the 1972 joint declaration between the two 
countries, their governments have repeatedly agreed to improve 
relations while not really implementing such agreements. But what 
about the 2018 agreements?
　On November 12th, 2018 an article appeared in the newspaper 
Hankyoreh entitled “Examining Inter-Korean Relations 200 Days after 
the Panmunjom Declaration.”
Examining progress on the 25 agreements in the Panmunjom 
Declaration and the Pyongyang Joint Declaration, we find 
that nine (36%) of them have been completely implemented, 
while 13 (52%) of them continue to be deliberated, either at 
a preliminary or subcommittee level. There were also two 
agreements (8%) that failed (holding an inter-Korean event on 
June 15 and a performance by a Pyongyang art troupe in Seoul 
in October), while there is one agreement whose implementation 
is contingent on other factors (deliberating the questions of the 
Kaesong Industrial Complex, resuming tourism to Mt. Kumgang 
and creating a joint economic zone on the West Sea and a joint 




　As for agreements related to using military tension on the Korean 
Peninsula, the newspaper states that partially due to the Panmunjom 
Declaration’s supplementary military agreement, their implementation 
rate was the highest. However, it notes that the implementation of 
agreed-upon items related to the construction of a peace regime on 
the Korean Peninsula is not progressing.
The problem is that this area requires the cooperation not only of 
South and North Korea but also of Korea’s neighbors and parties 
to the armistice agreement, including the US and China. The crux 
of this issue is North Korea’s denuclearization, a matter wholly 
dependent upon the results of the North Korea―US dialogue.
　Examining the ideals of Korean unification and a peninsular peace 
regime, which have been professed by the two governments’ joint 
statements and the like as well as considering their actual actions, 
we can see that while they assert the same position in writing, their 
reasons for doing so (what they are actually seeking) are opposed.
　The Panmunjom Declaration also calls for bringing “a swift end to 
the Cold War relic of longstanding division and confrontation” and 
improving and cultivating “inter-Korean relations in a more active 
manner.” Many times it has been agreed that the unification of the 
Korean people should be sought after establishing the peaceful 
coexistence of North and South Korea. 
　In this sense, perhaps, we could say that the issue of who gets 
to lead the unification of the Korean Peninsula has decreased in 
importance. However, the problem is that the two governments’ 
understanding of the necessary conditions for each polity to sustain 
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and survive peacefully does not match.
　North Korea is extremely concerned that its current regime will be 
overthrown due to a military attack or collapse due to the spread of 
anti-establishment sentiments. It appears unlikely that it will quickly 
change its policies of firmly maintaining military defensive power 
(symbolized by its nuclear armament), controlling the speech and the 
political participation of its citizens, and so on.
　While South Korea seeks an end to the Korean War in order to 
construct a peace regime as discussed in joint declarations, for 
this to happen, reconciliation between the US and North Korea is 
indispensable. However, the greatest obstacle to improving US―
North Korean relations is North Korea’s nuclear armament.
　In other words, North Korea’s nuclear armament is a point of 
dispute, and both countries’ aims regarding it cannot both be met. 
North Korea sees its nuclear armament as the most suitable policy 
for maintaining the country’s independence, but from South Korea’s 
perspective it is a major obstacle to the construction of a peaceful 
regime on the peninsula, in other words, South Korea’s peace. Here 
we should keep in mind that North Korea’s nuclear weapons are not 
aimed at South Korea.
　While North Korea’s nuclear armament can be seen as problematic 
in that it challenges the NPT regime, due to sanctions being led by 
Japan and the United States (which see its armament as a military 
threat), North Korea has heightened its vigilance to protect its regime, 
and has actually become more attached to its nuclear armament.
　For South Korea, in this situation, the worsening of US―North 
Korea relations and the peninsula being divided while a Korean War 
peace treaty remains at a standstill is a major loss.
　According to the problem-solving approach, the aim should be for 

North and South Korea to become partners that pursue the creation 
of an understanding in which their two desires are fulfilled at the 
same time. North Korea’s desire to maintain its regime and South 
Korea’s desire to end the Korean War and establish a peace regime.
　In the aforementioned US―North Korea joint statement, the US 
again sought the complete denuclearization of the peninsula. 
　One way to get the US to agree to effective regime maintenance 
and an end to the Korean War could be North and South Korea 
working together to present a roadmap to denuclearization of the 
peninsula.
　Turning to recent developments, partially due to President Moon 
Jae-in’s diplomatic skills, work has been done to improve US―North 
Korea relations at the 2018 Panmunjom meeting, the US―North 
Korea heads of states meeting in Singapore, and the Pyongyang 
meeting. However, it appears that progress is halting due to the lack 
of agreement at the 2019 US―North Korea heads of states meeting in 
Hanoi.
　According to media reports and the like, while North Korea 
prepared a phased denuclearization plan, the US pointed out that 
there were suspicions that facilities were being preserved, and they 
ended in disagreement. One also finds the view that Presidents 
Trumps’ own scandals, unrelated to the content of negotiations, 
had an influence. In order to make conflict resolution negotiations 
successful, as previously stated, those in conflict must come to an 
agreement, intend to implement it, and have the ability to do so in a 
sustained fashion. It is also probably important to determine whether 
the US administration has retained such anability.
　There is also a need for both North and South Korean governments 
to be responsible and able to continually implement any agreement. 
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It is with this confidence-building that the respective aims of these 
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